INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we put evidence from earlier chapters within a common framework, and give an overview of what this shows about the impact of policies towards poverty, inequality and social exclusion under New Labour.
A first danger is timing. If the 1950s were still "too early to tell" the impact of Second, by focussing on specifics, we may miss the bigger picture. We have tried to avoid concentrating only on the government's own agenda, but there is often more to say when policy has been active than when it has not. Many 1 data are from government sources, and relate to its own targets and priorities.
It is impressive that there is now an annual progress report on poverty and social exclusion, Opportunities for All -and that it could report in 2003d that 34 of its 44 indicators had improved over the medium-term (generally since New Labour came to power) while ten were steady and none had deteriorated (DWP, 2003d) . However, external views may be more convincing. For instance, the New Policy Institute's similar collection of indicators over a similar period shows 21 of its 44 indicators as improving, 16 steady, but 7 deteriorating (Palmer, et al., 2003) . This is less rosy than the official collection but none the less encouraging, and contrasts with its earlier assessment of 'New Labour's inheritance', when they had found 19 indicators improving in the medium-term, 11 steady, but 14 to have been deteriorating (Howarth, et al., 1998) .
Third, most evidence relates to trends over time and changes in them. But such trends may have been changing anyway. In many areas, continued good macro-economic performance -for which the government argues that it can take credit -has been the most important factor, not particular initiatives.
There is far more attention to evaluation and 'evidence-based policy' than there was before 1997, but relatively few policies have been systematically evaluated.
Finally, an issue recurs throughout the book: assessments may differ depending on whether the focus is on absolute changes for the most disadvantaged, or on their relative position. This is obvious when discussing absolute and relative poverty, but also applies in other areas. Even when considering differences between groups, there are two kinds of gap -absolute and proportionate. These can easily move in different ways -the absolute gap may be smaller, but the proportionate one larger. It is not that one measure is 'right' and another 'wrong', but which is appropriate depends on the precise question being asked.
A framework for summary
The stories told in early chapters are summarised below under four headings:
• Were the key problems recognised as a priority and was attention devoted to analysis?
• Were appropriate targets set for improvement, and specific policy changes made to address them?
• What evidence is there of impacts, both in terms of time trends, and from specific evaluations?
• What are the main problems and gaps in the policy mix as it has evolved?
The material is organised into three sections, first, evidence on poverty, divided between children, the working age population and pensioners, together with trends in income inequality. This is drawn from parts of Chapters 7 and 12 (child poverty), Chapter 8 (older people), and Chapter 11 (overall poverty and income inequality). The following section looks at broad policy areas: employment (Chapter 2), education (Chapter 3), health (Chapter 4), and political participation (Chapter 5). The third looks at particular target groups: poor neighbourhoods (Chapter 6), children in the early years (Chapter 7), services for older people and longer-term prospects for pensioner incomes (Chapter 8), ethnic inequalities (Chapter 9), and vulnerable groups (Chapter 10). Evidence from international comparisons (Chapter 14) and from the experiences of families in low income neighbourhoods (Chapter 13) is used throughout. Sources are given in the appropriate chapters, rather than repeated here.
POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY

Child poverty
Recognition and analysis: Child poverty emerged as a major New Labour preoccupation, the focus of its most prominent targets and of some of the Treasury's largest initiatives. A series of reviews and policy papers assessed a wide range of evidence on its causes and consequences.
Targets and policies:
The pledge to "end child poverty in a generation" (eventually defined as being "amongst the best in Europe" in relative terms), and the specific targets of cutting relative poverty by a quarter by 2004-05 and by half by 2010-11 are amongst the most ambitious. Major reforms to tax and benefit policy created the new tax credit system. Special additional lone parent benefits were phased out, but non-working lone and two parent families with children (particularly younger ones) have gained from the overall package as well as working families. Four-fifths of all families with children have benefited to some extent. The package of support for low-income working families with children is now one of the most generous in the world.
Impacts: In relative terms child poverty fell from 25% to 21% (BHC) or from 34% to 28% (AHC) between 1996-97 and 2002-03 (although it did not do so for all family types, rising slightly for children of two non-working parents).
Simulation modelling suggests that changes in tax and transfer policies have had a substantial effect, and that the target of a cut by a quarter by should be hit on the BHC basis, and will be close to being hit after housing costs. Between the years up to 1997 and 2001, the UK moved from having the highest relative child poverty in the EU to fifth highest, its rate falling while others rose. As average incomes were growing steadily, against a US-style absolute poverty line child poverty halved between 1996-97 and 2002-03. For lone parents, there were striking falls in indicators of material deprivation and financial stress between 1999 and 2002. Our new analysis of spending by low income families with young children shows that they have increased spending disproportionately on goods for children (clothing, footwear, toys and games), but also on some adult goods (such as clothing) where they had lagged behind.
Their spending on food increased, while it fell for other families; their ownership of certain consumer durables caught up somewhat.
Problems and gaps:
Child poverty was so high initially that there is still far to go to reach the EU average, let alone the best in Europe. For benefits and tax credits there are two clear issues. First, most of their values are by default linked to price inflation, not general living standards (including the 'adult' elements of benefits for families with children). 'New' measures are needed every year, just to stand still against the moving target of a relative poverty line -and more to make progress. Second, the reforms have reduced the deepest parts of the 'poverty trap', but have extended means-testing up the income range (Hills, 2004a, figure 10.7) . Pushing the strategy further means either widening or deepening the problem. Half of the low-income parents we spoke to reported frustration with administration of the new tax credits, and uncertainties about what they receive. Despite the tax credits, poverty rates for working lone parents remained high in European terms in 2001, partly reflecting low hours, but also low wages for women working part-time.
Working age poverty
Recognition and analysis: Policy has focussed on working age poverty as a consequence of worklessness or parenthood, rather than on income poverty in itself. Most official analysis has concentrated on the labour market and the situation of low-income parents. Problems and gaps: Although many employment measures have been successful, and registered unemployment has fallen substantially, significant 6 numbers remain without work and dependent on state benefits. Successful welfare to work policies may reduce the numbers dependent on out-of work benefits further, but those remaining will have real incomes steadily falling further behind the rest of the population.
Pensioner poverty
Recognition and analysis: The overall structure of pensions and income levels for today's pensioners have been the focus of two Green Papers and part of the annual Opportunities for All analysis.
Targets and policies: Pensioner poverty followed child poverty as an explicit focus of policy, and has not had a high profile target, but at the 2002 Labour Party Conference, Gordon Brown stated the aim of "ending pensioner poverty". The main policy has been to increase the means-tested minimum for pensioners and extend means-tested help higher up through the new Pension Credit. The basic pension has remained essentially linked to prices (although its real value has had a small increase). Special measures for all or some pensioners include winter fuel allowances, free eye tests, free TV licences, and increased income tax allowances.
Impacts: Relative poverty for pensioners has followed a different course depending on how measured: before housing costs it was no lower (21%) in 2002-03 than in 1996-97, but after housing costs, it fell from 27% to 21%. 
Problems and gaps:
The clearest immediate problem is continued lack of takeup by all those entitled to the means-tested minimum, despite initiatives to improve it (it is too early to tell whether the administrative changes with the new Pension Credit system will do so). Non-claimants, for instance receiving effect -had the tax and benefit system been left as it was in 1996-97, adjusted only for price inflation, this inequality measure would have been much higher.
In these terms, New Labour can claim to have halted its growth. Overall relative poverty -a measure of inequality at the bottom -was only a little lower in the year up to 2001 than it had been in the year up to 1997, but this was still the greatest reduction in the EU. By contrast, the ratio between incomes of top and bottom fifths rose slightly over this period, in contrast to other high inequality EU countries.
A key driver of overall inequality is that incomes and earnings at the very top continue to increase faster than others. Equally, incomes right at the bottom have not increased as fast as for other groups.
While this is affected by data problems, it also reflects lack of take-up of improved benefits for some, and price-linking of benefits for others.
POLICY AREAS Employment
Recognition and analysis: Employment was New Labour clearest priority when elected in 1997, and has remained so. Work, and the promotion of work, have been defining themes.
Targets and policies:
One of the five 1997 'early pledges' was to cut youth unemployment. There have been targets (now extended to 2008) for increasing the employment rates of disadvantaged groups (including lone parents, disabled people and minority ethnic groups) and for reducing the employment gap between disadvantaged groups and the overall rate, all under the slogans of "employment opportunity for all" and "work for those who can, security for those who cannot". Significant resources have gone into the New Deal programmes (particularly for young people), and tax credits for those in work (including help with childcare) intended -with the minimum wage -to reinforce the message that 'work pays'. The evolution of working age social security begun before 1997 continued, with employment services and benefit delivery combined as part of the continuing move towards 'active' policies for the unemployed.
Impacts: Registered unemployment has fallen to its lowest level in thirty years. Long-term unemployment is one of the lowest in Europe. Total employment is now at record levels, including increases in employment rates for lone parents and those aged between 50 and state pension age. However, economic inactivity rates have only fallen slowly for women, and have risen for men. The proportion of jobless households remains high in European terms, and the proportion of children living in them was still the highest in the EU in 2003, far higher than in most other countries. Most of these improvements relate to continued good macroeconomic performance -helped by employment measures allowing the economy to run at a faster rate without inflation than otherwise. Evaluations of specific employment measures show positive but relatively small impacts. Similarly, the net impact of the changes in tax and benefit structure on labour force participation has been positive, but not very large (although even this is a striking achievement, given increased incomes for some non-workers). Allowances, and two waves of reforms to higher education funding.
Problems and gaps:
Education spending has risen as a share of GDP since its 1999 low point, and is moving up the international range.
Impacts: At primary level, large class sizes have become less common, the numeracy and literacy hours have been positively evaluated, and attainment has not only risen overall (until 2001), but poorer schools improved fastest.
All this has been noticed and is popular with the parents we are interviewing in low income neighbourhoods. At secondary level the picture is more mixed.
The overall proportion achieving five or more 'good' GCSEs has increased, and social class differences have reduced, but remain large. EMAs have been positively evaluated, and early evaluation of Excellence in Cities is also positive.
Large social class differences remain, and may even have 
Despite changes by service providers, it is telling that more than half of the families we are talking to in low-income neighbourhoods feel that they have "no influence at all", even though most are connected to local groups in some way. This is not just a matter of the deficit in formal participation, but also reflects the way people are affected by key services such as social housing allocations. There are perceived conflicts between involvement and 'delivery', for instance in speeding the planning process and community involvement in decisions. Perhaps most importantly, what has been achieved has not led to any widespread excitement about the ideas of participation and involvement.
TARGET GROUPS Poor neighbourhoods
Recognition and analysis: Problems of low-income neighbourhoods have been a major focus of consultation and analysis since 1997, culminating in the SEU's National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal.
Targets and policies:
The overall target for the strategy -that "within 10-20
years, no-one should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live" -is perhaps New Labour's most ambitious. It is backed up by targets for particular outcomes, notably 'floor targets' for achievement in the most disadvantaged areas in employment, education, crime, health and housing.
Some policies have been for 'mainstream services', but others have been aimed at particular areas (particularly within England), such as neighbourhood wardens, Sure Start, and Excellence in Cities.
Impacts: At present, progress can only be measured at relatively aggregated levels (such as the most deprived fifth of local authorities as whole). At this level, looking across services and outcomes, progress is being made, although not always quickly enough to reach the targets set, and still leaving substantial gaps between poor areas and others. In some cases outcomes for poor areas are both improving and closing the gap on others (employment rates and teenage pregnancy), and in others this is being achieved, but not fast enough to meet targets (primary and secondary education). But mortality differences are widening around an overall improvement, and crime outcomes are mixed.
There are substantial differences between our own smaller-scale study areas, with some making significant progress but others not. Similarly, families living within these areas report mixed experiences, being positive about some initiatives (notably Sure Start and, for many, the New Deal for Communities), but less aware of others.
Problems and gaps:
Despite progress, substantial differences remain between areas, and not all poor neighbourhoods are improving. The biggest challenges are driving execution of policy down to lower levels, and making progress on the 'liveability' agenda: half of the families we spoke to felt that crime was a serious problem for them, and recent initiatives were only having slow effects.
Equally, 'neighbourhood renewal' cannot be tackled only within individual neighbourhoods, but depends on broader policies and economic developments.
Children and the early years
Recognition and analysis: 'Early years' policy has moved up the agenda. An early spending review resulted in the Sure Start programme, and the 2004 spending review included a cross-cutting study of the wider drivers and effects of child poverty. The emphasis on improving childcare provision has increased, linked to labour market policies, although issues around the quality of childcare and early education have tended to follow further behind.
Targets and policies:
There is an explicit target for increased childcare places 
Ethnic inequalities
Recognition and analysis:
In New Labour's first term, policy was framed by its response to the Macpherson Report, and its identification of 'institutional racism' within public services, leading to the Race Relations (Amendment)
Act of 2000, putting a statutory duty on public bodies to promote equality of opportunity. Ethnicity has generally been a sub-focus within more general 20 studies of disadvantage, rather than a focus in its own right (although the Cabinet Office's work on employment is an exception).
Targets and policies:
Most policies and targets have aimed at disadvantage in general, implicitly assuming that given their higher levels of disadvantage, minority ethnic groups will tend to be beneficiaries. There are some specific targets related to minority groups, such as raising employment rates and narrowing the gaps between these and the overall rate, and there have also been some policies specifically targeted at minority ethnic groups in Labour's second term, such as Ethnic Minority Achievement Grants to local authorities to improve educational achievement. 
Problems and gaps:
Despite evidence of improvement in many respects for most ethnic groups over the period, ethnic inequalities remain very large in many dimensions, with little evidence of policy success in reducing them so far. There appear to be tensions between some of New Labour's 'managerialist', target-driven policies, and the complexity of delivering services to diverse client groups. Area segregation remains a major issue.
Vulnerable groups
Recognition and analysis: A specific aim of the Social Exclusion Unit established in 1997 was to focus on vulnerable groups, particularly those where current disadvantage was linked to later disadvantage, and where responsibilities fell between government departments. It has produced powerful analysis of the position of particular groups, notably teenage parents, ex-prisoners, children leaving care, pupils truanting or excluded from school, 16-18 year-olds not in education, employment or training, and rough sleepers.
However, its coverage has been selective, and other vulnerable groups that have not been subject to such attention. 
Targets and policies:
Problems and gaps:
For some of the groups officially identified, the action that has followed appears less strong than warranted by the analysis. In some cases there is a conflict in interest between those identified as vulnerable and others who may also be disadvantaged -for instance other pupils in classes with disruptive pupils. Other groups -for instance, older pensioners or disabled children -have come lower down the agenda. The example of asylum seekers shows that there are strict limits to the government's 'inclusion' agenda: some groups are clearly excluded from it.
NEW LABOUR'S RECORD IN PERSPECTIVE
A first overview is given by Figure 15 .1, based on analysis by the Institute for The contrast is clear. While Mrs Thatcher was Prime Minister, incomes at the top grew rapidly. Lower down the distribution they grew much less fast, and at the bottom by very little. Average living standards grew, but income inequality widened rapidly, and the poor fell behind. During the Major years, the growth in inequality was partly reversed, but there was only slow growth in living standards for any of the groups. After 1997, all income groups enjoyed quite rapid growth in living standards. This did not mean much fall in inequality, and only a slow decline in relative poverty, but it did involve much faster growth in living standards for the poor than either of the earlier periods, and so resulted in rapid falls in absolute poverty.
For many concerned with disadvantage, the latest period is clearly preferable to the other two. Whether this makes it a 'success' depends on expectations.
To illustrate this, Table 15 .1 compares the position in the year Labour left three periods of office (or up to 2002-03 for New Labour) with that in the year before it came to office. It shows GDP growth, the change in real incomes for the two poorest tenths and the median, relative poverty for the whole population and for children (numbers with less than half mean income), and income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient).
[ One day, perhaps we may see."
Second, the issues have been recognised as multi-faceted and inter-linked.
Policy debates have focussed on cash incomes and services today, but also on long-term drivers of disadvantage and of life chances for children. This has partly followed from the impressive range of analysis on which government has drawn, both newly commissioned (for instance resulting from pilots and evaluations), and assembled from other sources. Whether or not policies were really 'evidence-based', much evidence has been assembled and made But in many areas no specific evaluations are available, and we depend on overall time trends. Two parts of the context for these may lead to contrasting overall judgements:
• The improvements we describe in many areas have taken place while the economy has been growing steadily, and indeed has been doing so for ten years. In some ways that makes it easier to achieve improvements, for instance in employment rates. But in others it makes it harder: achieving a reduction in relative poverty while general living standards are rising fast is harder than doing so when they are stagnating, particularly of course, if benefit levels remain price-linked.
Also, some of the groups now being reached out to are more deeply disadvantaged than those on the margins ten years ago.
• Second, the starting point when New Labour came into office was in many respects very poor, with particularly high levels of relative poverty, area polarisation, income inequality, and many indicators of exclusion having deteriorated. This also cuts two ways: is it relatively easy to cut poverty from a historically high level, or is it hard to start it moving in the right direction?
Finally, we have identified a number of recurring problems. In many areas there is an (often unacknowledged) conflict between government objectives of raising standards for all and of reducing differences between disadvantaged groups and others. For instance, much health policy has -naturally enoughaimed at improving the overall health of the population, but successes here have sometimes left the most disadvantaged lagging even further behind.
Similarly, raising the proportion of children attaining five 'good' GCSEs has been a dominant aim, but reducing numbers with no qualifications or improving more basic skills have lagged behind.
By contrast, in other areas, there has been a growth in means-testing or other forms of targeting, which have allowed limited resources to be focussed on those in greatest need (for instance, incomes and services for older people).
But as side effects, this may lead to problems of take-up and of widening disincentives to work or save.
Third, while there has been action on a commendable variety of fronts, earlier chapters and the summaries above identify a number of gaps, and areas where people are still being left behind. Most prominently, the default policy for most social security benefits and tax credits is to link their values to prices, not to general living standards. In some cases, this has created the fiscal headroom for large real increases in selected elements of the system to create both a more generous but also more rational structure. Overall, the results have been more progressive than an alternative policy of simply earningslinking all benefit levels without reform would have been. But it has left gaps, the consequences of which are becoming apparent -for instance in the way in which relative poverty rates for those of working age without children had reached record levels (albeit still below those for other groups) by 2002-03.
The speed with which some of this group have gained enough income from employment to escape poverty has not been fast enough to offset the way in which others are being left further behind.
Linked to this, the policies we have examined are the result of many specific initiatives, often fostered by the Treasury or the Social Exclusion Unit. But there is no overall strategy for doing what, for instance, the Irish government aims to do, in 'poverty proofing' all policy initiatives, to ensure that policy against poverty and social exclusion is part of the mainstream objectives of all parts of government.
There are two possible overall assessments of policy since 1997 that the evidence we have assembled should dispel. First, that there has been little 31 difference between the policies pursued in the years before 1997 and those pursued since. This is manifestly incorrect. In some of the most important areas, it is fair to say both that the tide has turned, and that policy has contributed to turning that tide. This is no mean achievement. A second reaction would be to go from this to conclude that policy has succeeded, and
Britain has indeed already become a more equal society. In some respects it has, but in virtually all of the areas we have discussed in this book, there is still a very long way to go to reach an unambiguous picture of success, and sustained effort will be needed to make further progress.
